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INTRODUCTION

The Hagia Sophia is one of the finest surviving
examples of Byzantine architecture “rich with mosaic and
marble pillars and coverings.”1 The distinctive dome was a
technical triumph and the basilica the reigning architectural
achievement of Late Antiquity.2 The splendor of this
magnificent building would have great impact on the future
of Russia.
Christianity had penetrated Kiev Rus, as Russia was
then known, by the 900s, and about 955 the grandmother of

Hagia Sophia, Istanbul, SACRED-DESTINATIONS (Feb. 13, 2018),
http://www.sacred-destinations.com/turkey/istanbul-hagia-sophia.
2 Id.
1
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Vladimir, the pagan prince of Kiev Rus, was baptized.3
Prince Vladimir was not a Christian, but a pagan renowned
for cruelty. He had hundreds of concubines and several
wives.4 Wanting to unite his people in one religion, but not
particularly moved by the usual spiritual stirrings, he sent
envoys to the center of the world’s major religions. It was the
envoys’ description of Hagia Sohpia that got Vladimir’s
attention.
Then we went to Greece, and the Greeks led us
to the edifices where they worship their God,
and we knew not whether we were in heaven or
on earth. For on earth there is no such splendor
or such beauty, and we are at a loss how to
describe it. We only know that God dwells there
among men, and their service is fairer than the
ceremonies of other nations. For we cannot
forget that beauty.5
In 988 Vladimir was baptized and married Anna, the
sister of the Byzantine Emperor Basil III. Perhaps it was the
influence of his grandmother, or perhaps the beauty of the
Hagia Sophia that caused true religious stirrings in Vladimir.
Whatever the cause, practical or mystical, Vladimir changed.

PAUL D. STEEVES, KEEPING THE FAITHS. RELIGION AND IDEOLOGY IN THE
SOVIET UNION 18-22 (1989).
4 100 Most Important Events in Church History, 988 Vladimir Adopts
Christianity, 28 CHRISTIANITY TODAY (1990),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/history/issues/issue-28/988vladimir-adopts-christianity.html.
5 Steeves, supra note 3.
3
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Significant for church history, Vladimir then ordered all the
inhabitants of Kiev to appear at the Dnieper River for
baptism or be considered enemies of the kingdom. Not only
did he build churches, he also destroyed idols, abolished the
death penalty, protected the poor, established schools, and
managed to live in peace with neighboring nations. On his
deathbed he gave all his possessions to the poor.6
He could not have known, though maybe he hoped,
that his embrace of Christianity would be felt in Russia more
than a millennium later. Ironically, Vladimir’s reasons for
finding religion were political – he wanted to unite his
people. His religious legacy, the Russian Orthodox Church,
has a rich and beautiful history tangled in politics – even as
the Church undergoes a religious revival today.
This complex, tangled relationship, historical and
current, between the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Russian state stands in stark contrast to the relationship
between church and state in the United States where the U.S.
Constitution separates the two. Excluding seventy years of
Soviet rule the Russian Orthodox Church enjoyed a position
of prominence in Russia, government favor and is
experiencing renewed growth after the collapse of
communism partly at the expense of other religions.
Part I of this paper traces the Russian Orthodox
Church’s history in Imperial Russia. Although a complete
history of the Church is impossible in the scope of this paper,
I try to provide enough history to illuminate the relationship
between the church and the state. Part II examines the Soviet
relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Soviets’ treatment of religion in an officially atheist nation.

6

Christianity Today, supra note 4.
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Part III examines the current situation of religious freedom
in the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox
Church’s return to prominence. Just as a complete history of
the Russian Orthodox Church is impossible, so is a
recounting of the historical and worsening religious
persecution in Russia. Therefore, the paper will concentrate
on Christian persecution, at times of the Russian Orthodox
Church, and in Part III what is considered competitors to the
Russian Orthodox Church.
II.

THE HISTORY AND PROMINENCE OF
ORTHODOX CHURCH IN IMPERIAL RUSSIA

THE

RUSSIAN

After Vladimir’s baptism “[t]he new religion spread out
from the cities to the countryside and though pagan resistance
and ritual lingered for centuries, especially in the north,
evangelization was on the whole remarkably peaceful and
swift.”7 From the earliest times this foreign church depended
on the backing of the Russian princes for legitimization.
Therefore, the church followed the doctrine of caesaropapism,
which is the submission of the church to the state, unlike
western Catholicism8 where popes had the ability to
excommunicate rulers.
An early example of a church-influenced political
decision was one made by Prince Alexander of Neva. After
the Mongol invasion of 1237 his princedom of Novgorod was
the only independent princedom in Russia. However, facing

EDWARD ACTON, RUSSIA THE TSARIST AND SOVIET LEGACY 4 (2d ed. 1995).
Arina Lekhel, Note: Leveling the Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in
Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and
Religious Associations,” 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. 167, 174 (1999).
7
8
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enemies to the west, including German Teutonic Knights,
Alexander knew he could not protect two fronts. His choice
was based on religion.9 The Teutonic Knights wanted to bring
the Russian Orthodox Church back into the fold of the Pope
of Rome, while the Mongols, or Tartars as the Russians
referred to them, “required formal subordination and
tributes, but did not intervene in church life.”10 Alexander
choose Tartar-Mongol rule and thus saved the independence
of the Russian Orthodox Church, who by this time owned
about one-third of Russian land.11
Another example of the intertwined relationship
between church and state is the blessing Prince Dmitry
Donskoy received from Abbot Sergius. Now growing weary
of Tartar rule, in 1380 the Prince “asked the abbot’s blessing
on his struggle with the Tartars. Sergius blessed him and told
him to attack the foe without fear: “God will be with you.”
Dmitry met the enemy at Kulikovo Polye and it was a decisive
victory in Russian history. Thereafter, Abbot Sergius was in
constant demand as a reconciler of discords in both church
and state.”12 A beautiful sculpture of his blessing of Prince
Dmitry adorns the walls of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour
in Moscow, a memorial to a Russian victory both for both

9 Alexey D. Krindatch, Changing relationships between Religion, the State, and
Society in Russia, 67 GEOJOURNAL 267, 268 (2006) (Prince Alexander of Neva
is celebrated as one of the most venerated saints in the Russian Orthodox
Church).
10 Id. at 268.
11 Id.
12 McNamara, Fr. Robert F., St. Sergius of Radonezh, SAINT KATERI (2018),
http://www.kateriirondequoit.org/resources/saints-alive/sabasstephen-the-younger/st-sergius-of-radonezh.
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church and state and a modern reminder of their
relationship.13
Until the mid-15th century “the Patriarchs of
Constantinople appointed the Metropolitans, the heads of the
Orthodox Church in Russia.”14 But the fall of Constantinople
in 1453 led the Muscovite princes to declare Moscow the
“Third Rome.”15 After this time the Russian Orthodox Church
became independent from the Byzantine church and was the
national church of Russia.16 However, by the early 16th
century a split occurred within the church between the
stjazhateli or “possessors” and the nestjazhateli or “nonpossessors.”17 The non-possessors, perhaps Russia’s first
religious freedom promoters, “urged the clergy to shed

See The Donskoy Monastary, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (2018),
http://www.moscow.info/orthodox-moscow/donskoymonastery.aspx. (The Cathedral was originally “commissioned by Tsar
Alexander I on December 25, 1812, following the defeatand withdrawal of
Napoleon's troops from Russia. The Tsar proclaimed the cathedral a
monument of gratitude for the intervention of "Divine Providence for
saving Russia" from doom, and as a memorial to the sacrifices of the
Russian people.” In 1931, on order of Stalin, the church was demolished
and the site became a swimming pool. The only remnants of the cathedral
were the original marble reliefs, which are now on display at the Donskoy
Monastery built on the site where Prince Donskoy defeated the Tartars.
The monastery did not fare well under Soviet rule either, as it was closed
soon after the Russian Revolution, and chosen by the Bolshevik
government as the site for a Museum of Atheism. The Patriarch of the
church was held prisoner in the monastery from 1922-1923. Finally, the
monastery was returned to the church in 1992. The Russian Orthodox
Church received permission to rebuild the Cathedral at the end of the
Soviet rule in February 1990. The new cathedral, built as a replica of the
old,opened on December 31, 1999 and is the largest in Russia, an ability to
accommodate 10,000 worshipers. Both Abbot Sergius and Prince Dmitry
Donskoy are venerated as Saints in the Russian Orthodox Church).
14 Krindatch supra note 9, at 268.
15 Acton, supra note 7, at 18.
16 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 268.
17 Id.
13
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material wealth and pursue their spiritual mission
unencumbered,”18 and “objected strongly to all forms of
constraints or violence toward heretics.”19
Conveniently, Ivan III backed the non-possessor
movement since this would have relieved the church of
monastic lands and influence.20 However, the possessors
were led by a fiery abbot, Joseph of Volokolamsk, and
emphasized a strong relationship between church and state
and the more common sixteenth century religious view on
treatment of heretics: “if heretics do not give up their beliefs,
the Church should seek the help of the State to severely
persecute them.”21 The conservative response of the
possessors won out and the union between the Orthodox
Church and the Russian state was cemented.22
By the eighteenth century, Russia was a major
European power.23 Peter the Great (1689-1725) opened
relations with the west. “Culturally, it was a painful
experience because it exposed Russia to competing socioeconomic norms and demonstrated Russia’s backwardness,
especially in education, economics and technology.”24 By
Peter’s reign, the church had become the one institution with
which the monarchs were still compelled to reckon,25 and the
nature of the union would change. As he had modernized
Russia with autocratic orders, he turned to the church,

Acton, supra note 7, at 19.
Krindatch supra note 9 at 269.
20 Acton, supra note 7, at 19.
21 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 269.
22 Id.
23 Acton, supra note 7, at 39.
24 Lekhel, supra note 8, at 176.
25 Acton, supra note 7, at 47.
18
19
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abolishing the position of Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox
Church in 1721 and creating the Holy Synod. The Holy Synod
was comprised of “three bishops and nine monastic or
married clergy” and most importantly “were appointed or
dismissed solely at the Emperor’s discretion.”26 Later,
Catherine the Great (1762-1796) seized church lands and
enterprises and closed more than half the monasteries.27 The
national church of Russia had become nationalized and clergy
considered state employees.28
Peter’s contact with the West attracted westerners to
Russia and brought both Catholics and Protestants into the
country. Throughout the Imperial Period these groups
enjoyed varying degrees of tolerance. Peter allowed great
personal religious freedoms for newcomers as he continued
to try and attract westerners but persecuted domestic nonOrthodox believers.29 Territorial expansion under Ivan the
Terrible into Siberia brought Muslims into the country while
eighteenth century expansion in today’s Latvia and Estonia
brought many Lutherans into Russia.30
“Ethnic” religions like Islam, Buddhism and Judaism
were tolerated by the Russian state.31 Among other Christian
denominations, the Protestants fared better than Roman
Catholics for two reasons. First, the state perceived Catholics
to be more loyal to Rome than Russia. And second, the

Krindatch, supra note 9, at 269.
Id.
28 Id.
29 Lekhel, supra note 8, at 177.
30 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 270.
31 Id.
26
27
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Russian Orthodox Church viewed them as a closer competitor
than the Protestants.32
Later the inclusion of non-Russians into the empire would
have severe consequences.
The 1897 census showed only forty-three percent of the
population to be Great Russians.33 The last two tsars pursued
a harsh policy of Russification aimed to “create a uniform
legal order and administrative system, but accompanied by
measures promoting Russian culture and Orthodoxy and
discriminating against minority languages and religions.”34
The regime’s overt identification with the ethnic Russians and
the Russian Orthodox Church alienated the minority
nationalities and spelled doom for the Church once the tsars
were no longer in power.35
III.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE SOVIET UNION
A. THE FALL OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Beginning in 1917, the communist revolution brought
an end to Imperial rule and the prominence of the Russian
Orthodox Church. In the Soviet Union, officially an atheist
state, religion was pushed from public life. In January 1918
the new communist authorities adopted the “Decree about
separation church from the State and the school from the
church’ [which] would fit nicely into the legal framework of

Id.
The term is formerly used to distinguish ethnic Russians from other
constituent peoples of the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire.
34 Acton, supra note 7, at 106.
35 Id.
32
33
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Western democratic societies.”36 It stated “[f]or the purpose of
securing to the workers real freedom of conscience, the
church is to be separated from the state and the school from
the church.”37 However, there are fundamental differences in
freedom of religion in United States and that found in the
Soviet Union. Freedom of religion, or conscience, in the Soviet
Union meant that churches “were forbidden to engage in any
activities that were within the sphere of responsibilities of the
state. That meant, for example, churches could not give to the
poor or carry on educational activities.”38 In the U.S. churches
are allowed to carry on charitable and educational activities,
and even encouraged to do so by receiving tax-exempt status.
Furthermore the official link between the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Russian State prior to the communist
revolution, if emulated in the United States, would have been
a violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Establishment Clause,
which forbids the government from establishing a state
religion, and favoring one religion over another.39
The Soviet government recognized religious freedom
and separation of church and state only nominally. “But
renunciation of religious faith is a condition of membership
in the ruling Communist Party and in its junior organization,
the Union of Communist Youth; and no effort of agitation and

Krindatch, supra note 9, at 271.
GENERAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC [CONSTITUTION] July 10, 1918, art. 2.
38 HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND
RELIGION, 395 (1993).
39 U.S. Const. amend. I “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”
36
37
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propaganda is spared to wean away the peoples of the Soviet
Union from all forms of religious practice.”40
At the same time as the communists were espousing
the separation of church and state, they passed legislation
stripping the Russian Orthodox Church of its previous
privileged position.41 “Until the mid-1920s the major target of
the State’s anti-religious policy was the Russian Orthodox
Church because it was directly associated with the
demolished Russian monarchy.”42 Some of the most sacred
places of worship, like the Donskoy Monastery, became
museums of atheism.43 The words of Lenin summed up the
new government’s attitude:
Religion is one of the forms of spiritual
oppression, lying everywhere on the masses of
the people, who are oppressed by eternal work
for others, need and isolation. The helplessness
of the exploited classes in their struggle with the
exploiters just as inevitably generates faith in a
better life beyond the grave as the helplessness
of the savage in his struggle with nature
produces faith in gods, devils, miracles, etc. To
him who works and is poor all his life religion
teaches passivity and patience in earthly life,
consoling him with the hope of a heavenly
reward. To those who live on the labor of others

WILLIAM CHAMBERLIN, SOVIET RUSSIA: A LIVING RECORD AND A HISTORY
(1930),_https://www.marxists.org/archive/chamberlinwilliam/1929/soviet-russia/ch13.htm#foot-1.
41 Lekhel, supra note 8, at 178.
42 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 271.
43 Acton, supra note 7, at 183.
40
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religion teaches benevolence in earthly life,
offering them a very cheap justification for all
their exploiting existence and selling tickets to
heavenly happiness at a reduced price. Religion
is opium for the people.44
Not only did the communist regime seek to end the
practice of religion but, in an ironic twist, it sought to replace
it with atheism in an almost religious manner. After Lenin’s
death in 1924 “[t]he writings of Lenin were treated as sacred
text from a prophet and became the final justification of any
act. Lenin’s embalming further played on the Russian
Orthodox belief that the bodies of saints decompose at a
slower rate. Placing Lenin under glass in a state of suspended
animation directly replicated the display of the bodies of
saints in monasteries throughout Russia.”45
By April 1929 priests were not considered to be
“workers,” and thus were taxed at a rate similar to
entrepreneurs. Priests were also denied entrance into the
military and then required to pay a special non-service tax. In
some cases, these two taxes combined were more than one
hundred percent of a priest’s income.46 By the mid-1930s
organized religious activity was illegal and thousands of
clergy were arrested, placed in concentration camps, expelled

Chamberlin, supra note 40.
Paul Froese, Forced Secularization in Soviet Russia: Why an Atheistic
Monopoly Failed, 43 JOURNAL FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION, 35, 43
(2004).
46 Studies in Soviet Thought, 41, no. 2,147-150 (1991) (reviewing Dimitry V.
Posielovsky’s A History of Soviet Atheism in Theory and Practice and the
Believer).
44
45
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or executed.47 The policy was frighteningly successful. “[T]he
Russian Orthodox Church had about 54,000 parishes in 1914,
[but] by the beginning of World War II only 200-300 Orthodox
parishes were still functioning in Russia. Only four bishops
remained in their positions in 1939 as legally acting ruling
bishops.”48
B. THE GREAT RETREAT AND WORLD WAR II
By 1934 Soviet leaders were faced with a rising threat
from Nazi Germany. In what is known as the Great Retreat,
leaders decided to retreat from socialism and “restore some
traditional institutions and culture to gain the population’s
support. They thus . . . resorted to patriotic appeals; they
buttressed the family and schools as key institutions in
Soviet society. . .”.49 Similar to Tsarist policies of
Russification, the trend towards centrally imposed
uniformity grew even stronger, and the measure of cultural
autonomy enjoyed by the minority republics was further
narrowed. Growing emphasis on the Russian language was
one facet of this: at school all children were to learn Russian
as their second language, if not their first. Likewise, the
‘Great Retreat’ saw further, if more measured anti- religious
measures which hit minority groups, including Muslims,
Buddhists, Baptists and the Armenian and Georgian
Churches, as much if not more than the Russian Church.50

Krindatch, supra note 9, at 271.
Id.
49 David L. Hoffman, Was There a “Great Retreat” from Soviet Socialism?
Stalinist Culture Reconsidered, 5 KRITIKA: EXPLORATIONS IN RUSSIAN AND
EUROPEAN HISTORY, 651-674 (2004).
50 Acton, supra note 7, at 237.
47
48
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Interestingly, the 1937 census indicated that fiftyseven percent of Soviets were still believers. The census
results were suppressed and the question about religious
beliefs was eliminated from the census of 1939.51
In 1941 Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, violating the
non-aggression pact. The first to appeal to the Soviet people’s
patriotism was the Metropolitan Sergi.52 In 1943 he was
elected as a new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church,
an “action that symbolized the beginning of legalization and
restoration of the institutional structure of the Russian
Orthodox Church.”53
In 1943 Stalin met with the Metropolitan Sergi at the
Kremlin and shortly afterward the Council for the Affairs of
the Russian Orthodox Church was created (CAROC).
Churches and monasteries began to reopen as did
theological schools, and the number of clergy began to
grow.54 There are a number of explanations as to why Stalin
allowed this. Perhaps the social authority of the church
would mobilize the population during World War II, foreign
policy made it necessary to demonstrate to the allied powers
the existence of religious freedom in the Soviet Union, or
perhaps it was to gain the sympathy and support of the
millions of Russians abroad.55 Also, the western areas of the
Soviet Union under Nazi control during World War II were
experiencing a remarkable religious revival, often times

PHILIP WALTERS, The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet State, 483
THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE, 134-145 (1986).
52 Id. at 137.
53 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 271.
54 Walters, supra note 51, at 139.
55 Krindatch, supra note 9, at 271.
51
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encouraged by the German military authorities. Stalin was
forced to win the sympathy of believers that still existed in
the Soviet Union.56
In 1944 the Council for the affairs of religious cults
(CARC) was founded to oversee the actions of churches
other than the Russian Orthodox Church.57 I.V. Poljanski was
appointed to head the CARC, a position he held until 1957.58
“Poljanski told the representatives that the main task of the
Council is to establish ties between the government of the
Soviet Union and the leaders of religious associations for the
resolution of issues requiring a governmental decision, such
as the opening of cultic (that is, worship) buildings. Poljanski
stated that the Council would contribute to the
normalization of the state’s relations with religious
associations.”
Further, Poljanski gave his viewpoint on how the
Soviet government should view these cults. “Such religious
organizations as the Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic and
Lutheran churches defected to the enemy and started to
almost entirely defend the interests of German
imperialism.”59 The conclusion is that different religions
would fare differently in the Soviet Union depending
primarily on their perceived loyalty to the communist
regime, and their level of influence and activity among the

Id.
Riho Altnurme, Religious Cults, Particularly Lutheranism, in the Soviet
Union in 1944-1949, 6 TRAMES, J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI., 3, 4 (2002). (Later this
group and the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church
were merged into the Council for Religious Affairs in 1965).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 6.
56
57
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people.60 For example, the government was particularly
concerned with “Baptists and Adventists – the clergy was
closely related to believers and in many respects dependent
on them, as stated in the document. Churches that had close
relations with people [unlike the hierarchy structure of the
Roman Catholic Church] were dangerous in the eyes of
Soviet authorities. …Baptists and Adventists became the
particular targets of government attacks.”61
To exist legally in the Soviet Union, a religious group
had to register with the state.62 This was a very effective
method of control for the Soviet government. First, it could
deny registration to any group of which it did not approve
and second it provided information as to who belonged to
what group. Poljanski made reference to using this
information.
While not placing obstacles to the existence of
the latter [that is, the Roman Catholic and the
Lutheran Church] and performing the
registration
of
the
already
existing
congregations of the said cults, the Council and
its local employees shall implement all the
measures to the effect that the administration of
the said churches and other prominent figures
among cultic servants and believers take the
path of the full recognition of the Soviet power,

Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
62 Lekhel, supra note 8, at 179.
60
61
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together with all the consequences arising from
that.63
It is important to note that “legal” religious activity for
registered churches was very limited. The “favored” Russian
Orthodox Church was required to get “permission to ring
the church bells or organize a religious procession around
the church building.”64 The Church was allowed to conduct
worship services and eventually to print a small number of
worship materials. But social work or religious education
were not permitted.65
C. POST-WORLD WAR II
By 1949 the trend towards reopening places of
worship reversed itself. Buildings would not be opened
without the request from at least one thousand worshippers.
The CARC was authorized to close churches that had only a
handful of faithful worshippers and “churches where
“counter-revolutionary” activity was taking place.”66 The
political landscape had changed as well. The end of World
War II meant foreign policy considerations no longer
required the Soviet Union to appease allies or gain support
from Russians abroad.
On December 10, 1948, fifty-six countries gathered in
Paris to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.67

Altnurme, supra note 57, at 7.
Krindatch, supra note 9, at 272.
65 Id.
66 Altnurme, supra note 57, at 15.
67 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948). [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
63
64
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Eight United Nations member states abstained: the USSR,
Ukraine, Belorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia,
Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.68 The USSR’s abstention was
the result of a very different conception of human rights in
the Soviet belief system. Western views of human rights are
that of ‘“negative’ rights: that is, rights of individuals against
the government. The Soviet system, on the other hand,
emphasized that society as a whole, rather than individuals,
were the beneficiaries of “positive” rights: that is, rights from
the government.” Soviet ideology placed great emphasis on
economic and social rights like adequate healthcare and food
supplies, housing, education and guaranteed employment –
much different that the capitalist West where the rights of the
individual and the importance of civil and political rights
was emphasized.69 Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes the
freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.”70
Instead of committing to the religious freedom the
Declaration put forth, within the Soviet Union church

Bertrand M. Patenaude, Regional Perspectives on Human Rights: The USSR
and Russia, Part One – USSR, SPICE (Fall
2012),
http://spice.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/RPHR_part1.pdf.
(Ukraine and Belorussia, although union republics of the USSR, had been
granted separate status as member states of the United Nations, as
requested by Stalin).
69 Id.
70 Universal Declaration, supra note 67.
68
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property had been seized and many congregations
registered. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Nikita Khrushchev
came to power. “The Geneva Summit of 1955 among Britain,
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and the
Camp David Summit of 1959 between Eisenhower and
Khrushchev raised hopes of a more cooperative spirit
between East and West.”71 In the area of religious freedom,
Khrushchev would prove anything but cooperative. While
Stalin, for political reasons, slowed the assault on religion,
Khrushchev renewed persecution, particularly in rural areas.
By the 1950s the collective farms had failed in
modernizing agriculture and improving yields. Instead
“collective farms still suffered from widespread absenteeism
and drunkenness, particularly on religious holidays, footdragging, low-productivity, and other traditional forms of
peasant discontent.”72 The Soviets considered religion to be
a cause of this rural backwardness. Eliminating religion was
one of Khrushchev’s “policies of rural modernization” so
that the rural Soviet Union could “finally overcome its
backward past, abandon religion, and enjoy an equal place
in the communist future.”73
Church closures continued although not always
smoothly for the government. Khrushchev’s anti-religion
campaign first targeted monasteries. On July 3, 1960 the
Rechulsky’s Women’s Monastery was emptied and closed,

The Soviet Union and the United States, Revalations from the Russian
Archives,_LIBRARY_OF_CONG._(2004),_https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/ar
chives/sovi.html.
72 Andrew B. Stone, Overcoming Peasant Backwardness: The Khrushchev
Antireligious Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union, 2 THE RUSSIAN REVIEW
67, 296,301 (2008).
73 Id.
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but not without a show of true conviction by the nuns and
surrounding parishioners. The nuns of the monastery told
their relatives and nearby villages they were being oppressed
and threatened with closure. Ringing the church bells, they
summoned workers form the surrounding collective farms.
Within two days 200-250 workers surrounded the monastery
armed with “pitchforks, sticks and stones” and ready to do
battle with the Soviet militia sent to close the monastery.74
This protective mob “brutally beat up an agronomist” from a
collective farm and seriously injured, among others, a
Lieutenant Dolgan when villagers tried to murder him with a
pitchfork.75
Education was considered the primary weapon in
fighting rural backwardness during the Khrushchev years.
“Drawing on Marxist explanations for the origins of religion,
Soviet ideology equated all religious belief with superstition
and ignorance about natural phenomena, and consequently
presented scientific knowledge and technological innovation
as the antidote.”76 Lecture bureaus were formed with
instructions that at least half of lectures given in rural areas
need to be on scientific-atheist themes.77
Another tactic of the Soviet regime was to limit the
influence of the samochintsy, or “self-appointed religious
leaders. These were individuals who took it upon themselves
to
perform the duties that were often left vacant by the lack of
clergy.”78 It was in this area that the Soviets had an unlikely

F. Corley, Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader 208 (1996).
Id. at 208.
76 Stone, supra note 72, at 302.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 304.
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ally: the Russian Orthodox Church. The samochintsy were
viewed by the Orthodox church as a threat to their canonical
authority and of further jeopardizing the church’s precarious
position in the officially atheist Soviet Union. Politics and the
church tangled again as they agreed on this issue, even if their
motives differed.79
The 1977 Fundamental Law again laid out the freedom
of religion and separation of church and state within the
Soviet Union. Article 52 states, “Citizens of the USSR are
guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess
or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious
worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or
hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.80 In the USSR, the
church is separated from the state, and the school from the
church.” However, “[t]he underlying principle of the policies
toward religion can be seen in article 51 of the 1977
Constitution which permits only those organizations which
contribute to the building of communism.”81
In regards to whether Articles 51 and 52 conflict with
each other, evidence shows that by the 1970s dissatisfaction
with communism was producing a religious revival within
the Soviet Union and a large number of protests that
demanded religious rights in the Brezhnev era.82 The
pitchfork incident described above shows that there were

Id.
Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Oct. 7, 1977
https://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/77cons02.html.
81 David Kowalewski, Religious Belief in the Brezhnev Era: Renaissance,
Resistance and Realpolitik, 3 J. FOR THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 19, 28092 (1980).
82 Id. at 290.
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areas of the Soviet Union through the 1960s that never
embraced atheism. The September 8, 1971 issue of the
Leningradskaya Pravda newspaper [The Leningrad Truth],
“deplored the fact that ‘the number of [Christian] [. . .]
ceremonies [such as christenings and weddings] is increasing
[. . .] and the participants of such rites [. . .] are naturally
young.’”83 Most frightening to the Soviet authorities was the
fact that religious awakenings did not seem to be a whim, but
a true search for the meaning of life—a sure sign that
communism was failing.
In the early days [. . .] young people [. . .] could throw
their enthusiasm into building a new life and a new future.
But for most of them the new future has not turned out as they
had expected. Ideals have been abandoned. The Soviet Union
is now merely following the West on the road of materialism
[. . .]. Small wonder there is a craving for higher goals than
these. Atheist articles in the press have remarked that what
young people are looking for most of all is a meaning to life.84
IV.

AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR

The year 1988 marked the millennium of Prince
Vladimir’s baptism in 1988 and of Christianity in Russia. In
April of that year, Mikhail Gorbachev pledged to the
leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church that he “would
implement policies that allow the church to carry out its
activities without state interference and that ‘a new law on
freedom of conscience, now being drafted, will reflect the

David Kowalewski, Protest for Religious Rights in the USSR: Characteristics
and Consequences, 4 THE RUSSIAN REVIEW 39, 426-41 (1980).
84 Id. at 282.
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interests of religious organizations.’”85 Gorbachev made that
same promise to Pope John Paul II when he became the first
Soviet head of state to visit the Vatican.86 At the time
Gorbachev made these promises, there were “less than 7,000
functioning parishes and 21 monasteries belonging to the
Moscow Patriarchate in 1988.”87
The celebration of the millennium marked the end of
state attempts to ban the Russian Orthodox Church from
public life.88 Churches began to re-open, monasteries were
restored, prayers and processions reappeared in public, and
there was media coverage of religious events.89 Suddenly
religion was no longer a sign of the “backwardness” that
Khrushchev fought, but of “civic boldness and liberalism.”90
In October 1990, the law Gorbachev promised was
incorporated into the Soviet legal code and known as “Law
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.”
This declared all religions equal under the law and
“prohibited the state from ‘any direct or indirect limitation on
the rights of a citizen or the establishment of any advantages
for citizens’ because of their religion.”91 Further, there was to
be “no state religion, no state function assigned to religion, no
state intervention in religious affairs, and no funding of
organizations or activity associated with the ‘propaganda of

James E. Woods, Jr., The Battle over Religious Freedom in Russia, 35 J. OF
CHURCH AND STATE 491 (1993).
86 Id.
87 Tobias Köllner, Works of Penance: New Churches in Post-Soviet Russia, In
VERKAAIK OSKAR, RELIGIOUS ARCHITECTURE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES, , AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS (2013), 83-95.
88 Id. at 83, 85.
89 Id. at 83.
90 Lekhel, supra note 8, at 183.
91 Woods, supra note 85, at 491-492.
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atheism.’”92 The law passed the Supreme Soviet with a vote
of 341-2, and was the most sweeping religious freedom law in
Russian history.93
The Soviet Union’s last day of existence was Christmas
Day in 1991.94 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and
subsequent democratic election of Boris Yeltsin,95 the Russian
Federation would reaffirm these freedoms in its 1993
Constitution. The following Articles show the new nation’s
early attempts to commit to religious freedom.
Article 14
1. The Russian Federation shall be a secular state. No

religion may be established as the State religion or as
obligatory.
2. Religious associations shall be separate from the State
and shall be equal before the law.
Article 19
3. The State guarantees the equality of human and civil

rights and freedoms regardless of sex, race, nationality,
language, origin, material and official status, place of
residence, attitude to religion, convictions, membership

Id. at 492.
Id.
94 Kim Hjelmgaard, 25 Years Later: Shockwaves from the Breakup of Soviet
Union,_USA_TODAY_(Dec._21,_1996),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/12/21/sovietunion-25th-anniversary-collapse-russia- putin/95341672.
95 Krindatch supra note 9 at 272.
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of public associations, or of other circumstances. All
forms of limitations of human rights on social, racial,
national, language or religious grounds shall be
prohibited.
Article 28
Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of conscience and
religion, including the right to profess individually or
collectively any religion or not to profess any religion,
and freely to choose, possess and disseminate religious
and other convictions and act in accordance with them.96
These new freedoms brought waves of missionaries
and religious groups into Russia, including Catholics and
mainline Protestants, but also Hare Krishnas,97 Jehovah’s
Witnesses98 and Mormons.99 Within the span of two years
there were many religious movements, which included
national television programs by western evangelicals.100

RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONSTITUTION 1993 (rev. 2014), art. 14, 19, & 28.
Woods, supra note 85, at 492.
98 See Tom O’Conner, Religion in Russia: Jehovah's Witnesses Declared
‘Extremist Organization’ by Russian Justice Ministry, NEWSWEEK.COM (2018),
http://www.newsweek.com/russia-religion-jehovah-witnesses-declareextremist-organization-569953.(Jehovah’s Witnesses were officially
registered in the Soviet Union in March 1991 after the passage of the 1990
Freedom of Religious Confession law).
99 Mike Eckel, Russia’s ‘Yarovaya Law” Imposes Harsh New Restrictions on
Religious Group, RADIO FREE EUROPE, RADIO LIBERTY (July 11, 2016),
available at https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-yarovaya-law-religiousfreedom- restrictions/27852531.html.
100 Woods, supra note 85, at 492.
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The influx of these groups threatened the position of
the Russian Orthodox Church, which was only just regaining
prominence, and the in the minds of many, the unity of
Russian society.101 The 1997 law known as “On Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations” was the response.
Much more restrictive than what had been adopted in the
1993 Constitution, this law required new religious
communities to be in existence for fifteen years before gaining
legal recognition of the state, which only then would allow
groups to “open a bank account, own property, issue
invitations to foreign guests, publish literature, enjoy tax
benefits, or conduct worship services in prisons, state owned
hospitals, and the armed forces.”102 In short, there was now a
fifteen-year waiting period to do all the things religious
groups do and had been doing in Russia since October 1990.
The introduction of the 1997 Law states that the
Russian Federation is a secular state, but then “[r]ecognizing
the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history Russia
and to the establishment and development of Russia's
spirituality and culture” adopts the federal law.103 Among the
many provisions proclaiming freedom of conscience and
religion are others that are disturbing. For example, Section
3.2 states:
The right of man and citizen to freedom of
conscience and to freedom of creed may be

Id. at 493.
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT:
RUSSIA (2008), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108468.htm.
103 Note, Russian Federation Federal Law: "On Freedom of Conscience and on
Religious Associations" reprinted 39
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restricted by federal law only to the extent to
which this is necessary for the goals of
defending the foundations of the constitutional
system, morality, health, or the rights and legal
interests of man and citizen, or of securing the
defense of the country and the security of the
state.104
This language is ambiguous and open to
interpretation. History is full of missionaries and religious
minorities accused of disrupting the security of the state, early
Christians being a prime example, and this language provides
the government an easy tool for suppression or expulsion.
The 1999 U.S. State Department’s International Religious
Freedom Report states the “new, restrictive, and potentially
discriminatory law on religion . . . raise[s] questions about the
government's commitment to international agreements
honoring freedom of religion.”105 The report describes the
1997 law as “very complex, with many ambiguous and
contradictory
provisions.”106
Chapter two of the law creates a two-tiered system that
categorizes all religious associations into either groups or
organizations. Only organizations have achieved registration
and have legal recognition from the state. Aside from the

Id. at 874.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T. OF
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 1999: RUSSIA (Feb.
23,
2000),
https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/356.htm
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fifteen-year requirement, the organization must consist of at
least ten adult members.107 This precludes single missionary
families from ever achieving legal status. Section 8.5 states
“[a] centralized religious organization the structures of which
been active on the territory of the Russian Federation for no
fewer than 50 years as of the moment when the said
organization files its application for state registration to the
registering organ has the right to use ‘Russia’ and ‘Russian’ in
its names the words and derivatives.”108 In other words, if the
group wasn’t operating under Joseph Stalin, it would not be
identified with the nation.109
The State Department report provides a litany of
examples of groups denied the right to register, denied the
right to distribute Bibles, individuals’ employment
threatened, and groups not given permits to hold gatherings.
One year after the passage of the law, according to the
Russian Ministry of Justice:
[A]pproximately 80 percent or 320 out of 400
religious organizations were reregistered on the
federal level, representing 40 percent of the total
number requiring reregistration. At year's end,
the Ministry estimated that about half of the
16,850 religious organizations still were not
reregistered on the local level.110

1997 Law supra note 103, at 878.
Id.
109 State Dep’t., Russia Report supra note 105. (This requirement was struck
down by the Russian Constitutional Court in November 1999 when the
Court declared that groups registered before the 1997 law did not need to
re-register. However, the registration requirement was upheld).
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In the same way, the millennium celebration marked
the end of official communist persecution of religion, a second
event highlighted the Orthodox resurgence within the nation.
The surprising resignation of President Yeltsin in
December 1999 left Prime Minister Vladimir Putin
temporarily in charge until presidential elections could be
held. In a move reminiscent of Prince Dmitry Donskoy’s
blessing from Abbot Sergius before meeting the Tartars, Putin
received a blessing from the Russian Orthodox Patriarch
Alexi II when becoming acting- president.111 A week later,
during Mass at the newly reconstruted Cathedral of Christ the
Saviour in Moscow, acting-president Putin made this
statement: “Why has Christ come into the world? To liberate
people from sicknesses, troubles, and from death. In its
essence, Christmas is a holiday of hope.”112
The end of the 1990s marked a change in Russian
feelings. No longer satisfied to be “a poor copy of the West,
people began searching for a distinctly Russian identity.”113
The constant in the lives of the Russian people, at least for the
last one thousand years, is the Russian Orthodox Church.
Seventy-two percent of Russians claim to be Orthodox.114 This
classification can be misleading as it ranges from those who
are devout followers of the Russian Orthodox Church to those
who equate Orthodoxy to being Russian.115 “Over time the

Krindatch, supra note 9, at 272.
Andrei Zolotov, As Russians Prepare to Elect New President Putin Shows
Interest
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CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Jan.
1,
2000),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2000/januaryweb-only/23.0a.html.
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(2016).
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Russian government has come to treat the Moscow
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church as a de facto
state church, strongly favoring it in various areas of statesponsorship, including subsidies, the educational system, and
military chaplaincies; this favoritism has fostered a climate of
hostility towards other religions.”116 This favoritism also runs
counter to Russian Law. Last July President Vladimir Putin
signed the ‘Yarovaya Law,’ a measure intended to
battle terrorism and extremism.117 However, the law also
included tighter restrictions on religious activities,
particularly those of smaller denominations. For example, the
law forbids prayer meetings from taking place anywhere
except recognized religious buildings, like home churches.118
The law broadly bans missionary activities like “preaching,
praying, disseminating religious materials” and answering
questions about faith outside official designated areas.119
“Those convicted of extremism are now subject to up to six
years imprisonment, major fines equal to several years of
annual wages, and/or bans on professional employment.”120
In an approach frighteningly similar to the Soviet era, “the
Russian government views independent religious activity as
a major threat to social and political stability.”121 Numerous
groups are targeted by Russian authorities including

U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 69
(2017),http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2017.USCIRFAnnual
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117 Eckel, supra note 99. (The law is named for Irina Yarovaya a member of
the State Duma and United Russia Party. She is the Head of the
Parliamentary Committee for Security and Anti-Corruption).
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Muslims, particularly in the North Caucasus, as well as
Jewish and Buddhist communities.122
The Russian authorities have particularly targeted
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Indeed, since the passage of the law the
Justice Ministry filed suit in the Russian Supreme Court
seeking the “liquidation and prohibition” of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses’ faith, and requested the immediate closure of the
group’s headquarters in Moscow.123 The case sought to label
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ as an extremist group citing their refusal
for military service and their criticism of traditional
Christianity and Orthodoxy as reasons. The refusal to join the
military is an express right given to Russian citizens in the
1997 law. Article 3.4 states “A citizen of the Russian
Federation, in the event that military service contradicts his
convictions or creed, has the right to substitute alternative
civilian service for it.”124 Apparently, exercising this right
makes Jehovah’s Witnesses distinctly un-Russian.
The “group’s absolute opposition to violence, [is] a
stand that infuriated Soviet and now Russian authorities
whose legitimacy rests in large part on the celebration of
martial triumphs, most notably over Nazi Germany in World
War II but also over rebels in Syria.”125 This stand also makes
Jehovah’s Witnesses a good target. As pacifists, they will
never organize a protest and they do not vote, and therefore
have no political power. This lack of interest in politics is itself

Id. at 72-73.
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seen as suspicious behavior. “From the Russian state’s
perspective, Jehovah’s Witnesses are completely separate. [. .
.] The idea of independent and public religious activity that is
completely outside the control of — and also indifferent to —
the state sets all sorts of alarm bells ringing in the Orthodox
Church and the security services.”126
On April 20, 2017, the Russian Supreme Court voted to
accept the label of extremist and to liquidate the
Administrative Center of Jehovah’s Witnesses in Russia along
with 395 Local Religious Organizations used by Witnesses
throughout Russia. The Jehovah’s Witnesses have thirty days
to appeal the ruling.127
As the Russian Orthodox Church continues to become
a symbol of Russian nationalism other minority faiths may
find themselves similar victims and this puts many of these
groups in an uncomfortable position. Jehovah’s Witnesses are
theologically opposed to mainstream Christianity, and
therefore counter to Russian Orthodoxy, on several key
points. They do not believe in the Trinity and they avoid
celebrating Christian holidays and symbols like Christmas,
Easter and the cross.128 Other evangelical groups try to build
on the Russian familiarity with Christian history and
Orthodox culture which up to this point has allowed them to
escape the kind of widespread repression the Jehovah’s
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Witnesses have endured.129 But if other minority groups
remain silent in their opposition to the liquidation and
prohibition of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, these same groups
may find themselves also targeted. The current Moscow
Patriarch Kirill has said “there can be no place in Russia for a
free market in religious life” and called “foreign missionary
activity a sinister threat to the nation’s security.”130 The
Russian Orthodox Church is rumored to use its authority to
prevent religious groups from registering with the
government, and therefore keeping them from attaining legal
status.131
In 2006, The World Council of Russian People, an
annual event hosted by the Russian Orthodox Church, was
held at the Christ the Saviour Cathedral. That council
produced Russia’s Declaration of Human Rights and Dignity,
a document that contradicts the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.132 Unlike the inalienable concept of rights in
the United Nation’s document, according to the Russian
document “rights are either given by God or the State and the
maintenance and exercise of those rights is dependent on the
motives and actions of the individual.”133
Excerpts from the Russian Declaration highlight the
differences in how Russia views human rights compared to

Kate Shellnut, Russia’s Plan to ban Jehovah’s Witnesses Puts Evangelicals
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those set out in the Universal Declaration’s preamble, which
recognizes “the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family….”134
The Russian document, largely assumed to be authored by
Patriarch Kirill, reads, “[i]n performing good works, the
individual receives his dignity. Thus we distinguish the value
and dignity of the individual. Value is inherent; dignity is
acquired.”135 What are these good works? Are they to be
solely defined as state enhancing? The document helps
answer these questions.
The individual, in realizing his own interests, is
commanded to do so in correlation with the interests of his
neighbors, family, community, nation and all mankind . . ..
We must not allow situations to occur in which the realization
of human rights tramples upon religious or moral traditions,
insults religious or national feelings or sacred objects, or
threatens our homeland’s existence. It is dangerous to
“invent” such “rights” which make legal that behavior
condemned by traditional morality and all historic
religions.136
It is easy to read this document and see how the actions
of the door knocking Jehovah’s Witnesses might “insult
religious feelings,” or their refusal of military service offends
“national feelings” and threaten the “homeland’s existence.”
The other religious minorities in Russia must be terrified as
well.
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CONCLUSION

Actions of the Russian state, the Russian Orthodox
Church and the Russian Declaration show an emerging
relationship closer to that of the Tsars and the church rather
than the commitment to freedom of conscience promised at
the collapse of communism. Prince Vladimir sought to unite
his people under the banner of religion. His intentions were
spurred by nationalism, although there is evidence he became
a true believer. Under the Vladimir Putin regime there has
been a religious revival of the Russian Orthodox Church as
the Russian people throw off the religion-smothering blanket
of atheism. But in “finding God” the Russian people risk
losing freedom of religion if God can only be found in the
Russian Orthodox Church.
Religion and nationalism are very similar. “Both share an
imagined community and rely on the importance of symbols
to provide shared meaning for members. … Both offer a belief
system to members to assist them as they navigate through a
complex world. In addition, religion and nationalism develop
a common identity for their members to relate to.”137
Russian’s search for spiritual security cannot be at the
expense of spiritual freedom. By only supporting the Russian
Orthodox Church, the Russian state tramples religious
freedom, alienates portions of its own citizenry and damages
its reputation in the world. By assisting the state in the very
suppression she was once victim, the Church violates its
Christian commandment to serve all humanity.
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